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Abstract
A recent study shows that equilibrium indeterminacy arises if monetary policy
responds to asset prices, especially share prices, in a sticky-price economy. We show
that equilibrium indeterminacy never arises if the working capital of ﬁrms is subject
to their asset values by ﬁnancial frictions.
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1 Introduction
Should monetary policy respond to asset prices? A large number of studies have at-
tempted to address this question. For example, the insigniﬁcance of responding to asset
prices is reminiscent of the ﬁndings of Bernanke and Gertler (2001) and Gilchrist and
Leahy (2002). Iacoviello (2005) shows that little is gained by responding to asset prices,
if the central bank wants to minimize output and inﬂation ﬂuctuations. Faia and Mona-
celli (2007) ﬁnd a case where monetary policy should respond to increases in asset prices
by lowering the nominal interest rate.
A recent paper by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) provides a negative answer: equilib-
rium indeterminacy arises if monetary policy responds to asset prices in a sticky-price
economy. While many previous studies employ prices of capital as asset prices, Carl-
strom and Fuerst (2007) focus on share prices that reﬂect ﬁrms’ proﬁts. In their model,
an increase in inﬂation reduces ﬁrms’ proﬁts and asset prices decline. Then, monetary
policy responding to asset prices, or share prices, implicitly weakens overall reactions to
inﬂation. This is the source of equilibrium indeterminacy in their model.
In this paper, we show that equilibrium indeterminacy never arises if there is credit
market imperfection. We introduce a collateral constraint to the economy of Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2007). The working capital or wage payment of ﬁrms is subject to a collateral
constraint in our economy. In our economy, as in the economy of Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2007), an increase in inﬂation reduces ﬁrms’ proﬁts. However, share prices do not change
since the ineﬃciency of the collateral constraint increases and the premium of shares as
collateral increases.
Our result implies that under credit market imperfection, there is no negative aspect
of monetary policy responding to asset prices, as pointed out by Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2007). Since the discussion on monetary policy responding to asset prices often arises
during recessions associated with ﬁnancial crises, for example, Japan’s lost decade of the
1990s and the recent ﬁnancial crisis in the U.S. economy, our result for the economy with
ﬁnancial frictions would contribute to the literature on monetary policy.
Collateral constraints are often employed to account for the observed facts of business
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cycles in modern macroeconomics. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999); Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997); and Liu, Wang, and Zha (2009) show that collateral constraints amplify
the eﬀects of shocks. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998) show that collateral constraints
generate hump-shaped responses to shocks. Kobayashi, Nakajima, and Inaba (2007) and
Kobayashi and Nutahara (2007) show that a model with collateral constraints generates
comovements of output, consumption, labor, and investment to news shocks. Monacelli
(2009) shows that a model with a collateral constraint accounts for sectoral comovements
to monetary policy shocks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our basic economy
with a collateral constraint. Section 3 presents our main results: equilibrium indeter-
minacy never arises even if monetary policy responds to asset price ﬂuctuations under
credit market imperfection. Section 4 conclude the paper.
2 The model
Our model is based on that employed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007). One diﬀerence
from their model is that the collateral constraint on working capital. In order to introduce
the collateral constraint, the environment of our economy is slightly diﬀerent from that
of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007). However, equilibrium system is identical to that of
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) if the collateral constraint never binds.
2.1 Households: workers and managers
We consider households that consist of workers and managers. The household begins
period t withMt cash balances, Bt one-period nominal bonds that pay Rt¡1 gross interest
rate, an St stock of shares of stock of retailers that sell at price Qt and pay dividend Dt.
The utility function is
U(Ct; Lt;Mt+1=Pt) =
C1¡¾t
1¡ ¾ +
L1+°t
1 + °
+ V (Mt+1=Pt); (1)
where ¾ > 0, ° > 0, V is increasing and concave, Ct denotes consumption, Lt denotes
labor supply, and Mt+1=Pt denotes real cash balances at the end of period t.
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At the beginning of the period, a household splits into worker and manager. A worker
supplies labor Lt and earns wage income PtWtLt where Pt denotes the aggregate price
level. A manager employs labor to produce homogenous goods and sells them to retailers
at price PtZt.
The production technology of managers is
Yt = Ht; (2)
where Ht denotes labor demand. We assume that managers have to pay wages to workers
in advance and therefore borrow working capital from banks. Banks can issue bank notes
that can be circulated in our economy. Letting Nt be the amount that the manager
borrows, the manager’s choice of Ht is constrained by
PtWtHt · Nt: (3)
Since this borrowing and lending are intra-period, the gross interest rate of this is zero
in equilibrium. As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the manager cannot fully commit to
repaying the debt. Then, the manager’s borrowing is subject to a collateral constraint
Nt · 'PtQtSt; (4)
where 0 < ' · 1.1 In order to consider a collateral constraint, we assume that a worker
cannot supply labor to a manager from the same agent.
After the production of goods, worker and manager return home to decide consump-
tion and holdings of money and bond as a single agent: the household. The budget
constraint of the household is
PtCt +Mt+1 + PtQtSt+1 +Bt+1 + PtWtHt
· PtZtYt + PtWtLt +Mt + PtQtSt +Rt¡1Bt + PtDtSt +Xt; (5)
where Zt denotes the relative price of goods produced by managers and Xt denotes
monetary injection.
1A similar setting of the credit market imperfection is employed by Kobayashi, Nakajima, and Inaba
(2007); Kobayashi and Nutahara (2007); and Harrison and Wedner (2010).
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The ﬁrst order conditions of households are
C¾t L
°
t =Wt; (6)
C¡¾t = ¯C
¡¾
t+1
Rt
Πt+1
; (7)
C¡¾t Qt = ¯C
¡¾
t+1 [Qt+1(1 + 'Θt+1) +Dt+1] ; (8)
Wt(1 + Θt) = Zt; (9)
(WtHt ¡ 'QtSt)Θt = 0; Θt ¸ 0; (10)
where Πt+1 ´ Pt+1=Pt and Θt denotes the ratio of the Lagrange multiplier of the collat-
eral constraint to that of the budget constraint and can be interpreted as the ineﬃciency
of collateral constraint. (6) is the intratemporal optimization condition, (7) is the Eu-
ler equation of consumption, (8) is the Euler equation of assets, (9) is the marginal
productivity condition of labor, and (10) is the condition of the collateral constraint.
By (7) and (8), we have the more familiar asset price relationship:
Qt = [Qt+1(1 + 'Θt+1) +Dt+1]
Πt+1
Rt
: (11)
Note that in the case of binding collateral constraint, asset price is aﬀected by the
ineﬃciency of collateral constraint Θ. If a shock tightens the collateral constraint, the
premium of assets as collateral increases, and then it has a positive eﬀect on asset prices.
2.2 Retailers
We assume that the retailers are monopolistically competitive, as employed by Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). Retailers buy goods at price PtZt from managers, produce
diﬀerentiated goods using linear technology, and set prices. Under the standard Calvo-
type sticky-price setting, the New Keynesian Phillips curve is
¼t = ¸zt + ¯¼t+1; (12)
where lowercase letters denote log deviations from the steady state. Note that the real
wholesale price Zt can be interpreted as the real marginal cost of retailers. The retailers’
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proﬁts are paid out as dividends. Then, we have
Dt = (1¡ Zt)Yt: (13)
2.3 Monetary policy
We assume that monetary authority follows a simple Taylor rule:
rt = ¿¼t + ¿qqt; (14)
where lowercase letters rt and qt denote the log-deviations from a steady state of Rt and
Qt, respectively.
2.4 Equilibrium
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium with Ht = Lt. The total supply of share St = 1
and total supply of nominal bond Bt = 0.
The deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium is as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. Given monetary policy rule (14), a competitive equilibrium is a sequences
of prices f¼t; Qt;Wt; Zt; Rtg and quantities fCt;Ht; Lt; Yt; Bt;Mt; Dt;Θtg such that (i)
households maximize their utilities, (ii) retailers maximize their proﬁts, and (iii) all
markets clear.
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The equilibrium system of this economy is
C¾t H
°
t =Wt; (15)
C¡¾t = ¯C
¡¾
t+1
Rt
Πt+1
; (16)
Qt = [Qt+1(1 + 'Θt+1) +Dt+1]
Πt+1
Rt
; (17)
Wt(1 + Θt) = Zt; (18)
(WtHt ¡ 'Qt)Θt = 0; Θt ¸ 0; (19)
Dt = (1¡ Zt)Yt; (20)
Yt = Ht = Ct; (21)
¼t = ¸zt + ¯¼t+1; (22)
rt = ¿¼t + ¿qqt: (23)
3 Main results
3.1 Equilibrium indeterminacy and credit market imperfection
The following condition is necessary and suﬃcient for a binding collateral constraint at
a steady state.
Proposition 1. A collateral constraint (4) is binding at a steady state if and only if
' <
1¡ ¯
¯
¢ Z
1¡ Z : (24)
Proof. By the steady-state equilibrium system, we obtain
W = C¾+° ;
C =
·
Z
1 + Θ
¸1=(¾+°)
;
Q =
(1¡ Z)
h
Z
1+Θ
i1=(¾+°)
1=¯ ¡ (1 + 'Θ) :
Inserting these into a collateral constraint WC = 'Q yields
Θ =
Z [1¡ ¯(1¡ ')]
¯'
¡ 1:
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Θ is greater than zero if and only if (24) holds.
It is clear that this economy is identical to that of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) if a
collateral constraint never binds, that is, Θt = 0. Then, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2. Assume that (24) does not hold and a collateral constraint never binds.
(i) If ¿q = 0, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for equilibrium determinacy is ¿ > 1.
(ii) If ¿ > 1, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for equilibrium determinacy is
¿q <
¸(¿ ¡ 1)
(1¡ ¯)A;
where A ´ Z(1+¾+°)¡1(¾+°)(1¡Z) .
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 1 of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007).
Proposition 2 implies that equilibrium indeterminacy arises if ¿q is larger than a
threshold.
In this paper, we focus on a case where a collateral constraint is binding. It is
convenient to log-linearize our equilibrium system for the analysis. The linearized system
with a binding collateral constraint is as follows.
(¾ + °)ct = wt; (25)
¾(ct+1 ¡ ct) = rt ¡ ¼t+1; (26)
qt = ¯(1 + 'Θ)
·
qt+1 +
'Θ
1 + 'Θ
µt+1
¸
+ [1¡ ¯(1 + 'Θ)]dt+1 + (¼t+1 ¡ rt); (27)
wt + ct = qt; (28)
dt = ct ¡ Z1¡ Z zt; (29)
zt = wt +
Θ
1 +Θ
µt; (30)
¼t = ¯¼t+1 + ¸zt; (31)
rt = ¿¼t + ¿qqt; (32)
where lowercase letters denote log deviations from the steady state and
Θ =
Z [1¡ ¯(1¡ ')]
¯'
¡ 1: (33)
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This system is reduced to the following matrix form:26664
1 0 Φ1
1 0 Φ2
¯ 0 0
37775
26664
¼t+1
zt+1
qt+1
37775 =
26664
¿ 0 Φ1 + ¿q
¿ 0 1 + ¿q
1 ¡¸ 0
37775
26664
¼t
zt
qt
37775 ; (34)
where
Φ1 ´ ¾1 + ¾ + °
Φ2 ´ 1 + ¯(1¡ ')(¾ + °)1 + ¾ + ° :
The ﬁrst equation is the Euler equation of consumption (26). The second one is the
Euler equation of asset price (27). The last one is the New Keynesian Phillips curve (31).
Note that this system is closed by only ﬁrst and second equations with ¼t and qt.
The main result is as follows.
Proposition 3. Assume ¯ ¸ Z, (24), and a collateral constraint is always binding. A
necessary and suﬃcient condition for equilibrium determinacy is ¿ > 1.
Proof. Let x1; x2, and x3 denote three eigenvalues. It is obvious that one of them, x1, is
inﬁnity. The characteristic equation for x2 and x3 is
F (x) =
¸
1 + ¾ + °
(x¡ ¿)
½£
1¡ ¾ + ¯(1¡ ')(¾ + °)¤x¡ (1 + °)¾:
Then, the eigenvalues are x2 = ¿ and x3 = 1+°1¡¾+¯(1¡')(¾+°) . The numerator, 1 + °, of
x3 is strictly positive. The denominator is
1¡ ¾ + ¯(1¡ ')(¾ + °) > 1¡ ¾ + ¯
µ
1¡ 1¡ ¯
¯
¢ Z
1¡ Z
¶
(¾ + °)
= 1 +
1¡ ¯
1¡ Z¾ +
¯ ¡ Z
1¡ Z ° > 0;
by (24) and ¯ ¸ Z. Then, it is shown that x3 > 1 since
(1 + °)¡ [1¡ ¾ + ¯(1¡ ')(¾ + °)] = [1¡ ¯(1¡ ')](¾ + °) > 0:
Finally, ¿ > 1 is necessary and suﬃcient for equilibrium determinacy.
Proposition 3 implies that a central bank’s stance on asset price ﬂuctuations does
not aﬀect equilibrium determinacy if a collateral constraint is binding.
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3.2 Interpretations
Why is it that equilibrium indeterminacy never arises if monetary policy responds to
asset prices when the collateral constraint is binding?
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) explain that if the inﬂation increases permanently by
one percent and the central bank follows a policy rule (14), the nominal interest rate
increases by
¿ ¡ A(1¡ ¯)
¸
¿q: (35)
Their result is shown as follows. By the New Keynesian Phillips curve implies that
a permanent increase in inﬂation increases real marginal cost Z. By the steady-state
equilibrium system where a collateral constraint never binds, we have
Q =
(1¡ Z)Z1=(¾+°)
1=¯ ¡ 1 : (36)
Under reasonable calibration, it is shown that asset price Q is decreasing in Z. There-
fore, high inﬂation means low asset prices. Monetary policy responding to asset prices
implicitly weakens its overall response to inﬂation, and this is the source of equilibrium
indeterminacy in their model. This is an example of the celebrated Taylor Principle:
a permanent increase in the inﬂation rate leads to a more than proportionate increase
in the inﬂation rate. If (35) exceeds one, the monetary policy rule satisﬁes the Taylor
Principle.
On the contrary, if a collateral constraint is binding, we have
Q =
(1¡ Z)
h
Z
1+Θ
i1=(¾+°)
1=¯ ¡ (1 + 'Θ) (37)
and
Θ =
Z [1¡ ¯(1¡ ')]
¯'
¡ 1: (38)
These conditions imply that
Q = '1=(¾+°)
·
¯
1=¯ ¡ (1 + ')
¸ 1+¾+°
¾+°
; (39)
10
which, in turn, implies that asset price does not change if there is a permanent increase
in inﬂation. This is because the ineﬃciency of the collateral constraint Θ absorbs the
eﬀects of an increase in inﬂation. Then, the nominal interest rate increases by ¿ in
the economy with a binding collateral constraint. Finally, in our model with a binding
collateral constraint, a central bank’s stance on asset price ﬂuctuations does not aﬀect
equilibrium indeterminacy.
4 Concluding remarks
A recent paper by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) showed that equilibrium indeterminacy
arises if monetary policy responds to asset prices in a sticky-price economy where asset
prices reﬂect ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
Since monetary policy responding to asset prices is often discussed during recessions
associated with ﬁnancial crises, we introduce a collateral constraint into their model and
showed that equilibrium indeterminacy never arises even if monetary policy responds to
asset prices. An permanent increase in inﬂation reduces ﬁrms’ proﬁts and asset prices
decline in a standard sticky-price model. However, asset price does not change under
the credit market imperfection since the ineﬃciency of the collateral constraint increases
and the premium of shares as collateral increases.
Our result implies that equilibrium indeterminacy, a negative aspect of monetary
policy responding to asset prices, never arises under credit market imperfection. In order
to determine whether monetary policy should respond to asset prices, it is a future task
to investigate optimal policy in the economy with credit frictions. However, since the
discussion on monetary policy responding to asset prices often arises during recessions
associated with ﬁnancial crises, for example, Japan’s lost decade of the 1990s and the
recent ﬁnancial crisis in the U.S. economy, our result would have a certain implication
on the literature of monetary policy.
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